The Critique of Political Economy and The New Dialectic. Hegel, Marx, and Christopher J. Arthur's 'Homology Thesis' by Lange, Elena L
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
The Critique of Political Economy and The New Dialectic. Hegel, Marx, and
Christopher J. Arthur’s ’Homology Thesis’
Lange, Elena L
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-127750
Published Version
Originally published at:
Lange, Elena L (2016). The Critique of Political Economy and The New Dialectic. Hegel, Marx, and
Christopher J. Arthur’s ’Homology Thesis’. Crisis and Critique, 3(3):235-272.
234 235
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
The Critique 
of Political 
Economy and the 
‘New Dialectic’: 
Marx, Hegel and 
the Problem of 
Christopher J. 
Arthur’s ‘Homology 
Thesis
Elena Louisa Lange
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
1Abstract: In recent years, Christopher J. Arthur’s ‘New Dialectic’ 
has had a strong impact on Marx scholarship in the Anglophone world 
by highlighting the correlation of Hegel’s systematic (non-historical) 
dialectic with Marx’s central oeuvre, Capital, and especially Marx’s theory 
of the value form. He claims that the categories of Hegel’s Logic and 
those of the beginning of Marx’s Capital show a ‘striking homology...
given some minor reconstructive work.’ (Arthur 2004, p. 4).
This essay criticises Arthur’s reading of Marx and especially Hegel 
against the background of important contributions to Hegel scholarship 
in the last decades. This scholarship has been groundbreaking in 
the theory of dialectic and category-theory, in the systematisation 
of the antinomical structure of the concept and the problem of 
the semantic-pragmatic presupposition (semantisch-pragmatischer 
Präsuppositionsbegriff) of the scientific exposition. Notwithstanding its 
foundational character for a scholarly treatment and understanding 
of Hegel’s dialectic, these approaches are missing from Arthur’s 
intervention. 
This, as will be shown, has grave consequences for 1) Arthur’s 
reading of Hegel’s Logic, 2) Arthur’s application of Hegel’s dialectic to 
Marx’s presentation of the value form and 3) Arthur’s ‘sublation’ of Marx 
in Hegel.
It will be argued that Arthur’s misrecognition of Hegel’s dialectical 
method also negatively affects Arthur’s understanding of the scope and 
intent of Marx’s critical project, especially the necessary inner relation 
between abstract labour, value and money at the beginning of Capital 
vol. 1.  
Keywords: Marx, value form theory, Hegelian dialectic, critique 
of fetishism, antinomical structure, Dieter Wandschneider, Michael 
Theunissen  
1. Introduction
It is the view of the author of the present essay that a sound critique 
in the philological-hermeneutical sciences can only be justified on the 
basis that the texts in question have to be measured against their own 
claims. This is especially important when these claims are low, but 
requires no less of attention if these claims are high.2 To say that the basic 
categories of Marx’s Capital as they are unfolded in the first five chapters 
1  I would like to thank Riccardo Bellofiore and Raji C. Steineck for their helpful 
comments. Special thanks to Frederick Young for being a diligent English proof reader. 
2  To say a philosophical text’s claim is ‘low’ is not to denounce it. The high/low-
distinction merely serves as a rough heuristic to differentiate philosophical texts which argue, 
criticise, or analyse particular author’s or authors’ theorems (a ‘low’ claim) from texts of the much 
rarer sort that claim to ‘identify’ two major and arguably different philosophical systems and their 
categories (a ‘high’ claim), like the one under discussion.
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The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
of volume 1 are ‘homologous’ to or have to be ‘identified’ with those of 
both volumes of Hegel’s Science of Logic is certainly a claim of the latter 
kind. Even more so is the claim that Marx’s Capital in its basic structure 
follows the same method as the whole textual corpus of Hegel’s Logic. 
It therefore remains to be analysed how and in what way these claims 
are persuasive by always keeping in mind the ‘high’ or, rather, universal 
character of this claim: the general applicability of the main work of 
one of the philosophical tradition’s greatest thinkers to Marx’s Capital, 
probably the most rigorous and detailed account, but most importantly, 
critique of bourgeois capitalist society that we still have today. In other 
words, it must be shown if the ‘New’ or ‘Systematic’ Dialectic approach 
that makes this claim, exemplified in the works of Christopher J. Arthur, 
persuasively lives up to the homology thesis it makes 3: ‘What we can 
see … is a striking homology between the structure of Hegel’s Logic and 
Marx’s Capital, or, at least, a homology given some minor reconstructive 
work on either or both.’4
As one would expect, in this methodological-theoretical approach, 
a profound knowledge of both Marx’s as well as Hegel’s central oeuvre 
and their more recent trajectories and evaluations can be presupposed. 
What is both surprising and characteristic, however, is that in the 
‘New Dialectic’-approach that Arthur designates as his own5, the 
understanding of Hegel’s method is strikingly perfunctory. This is 
reflected in both in a superficial, sometimes even banalising reading of 
3  Apart from Arthur, there is a similar claim in the Anglophone Uno School 
who emphasise the parallels between Hegel’s Logic and ‘the dialectic of capital’ in the so-called 
‘homomorphism’-thesis, exemplified in the work of Thomas T. Sekine. See e.g. ‘The Dialectic of 
Capital: An Unoist Interpretation’ Science and Society vol. 62, no. 3 Fall 1998), p. 445. However, for 
reasons of space, the present essay will not review Sekine’s and other Anglophone Uno School’s 
(e.g. Robert Albritton’s) claim separately, even if my criticism could be extended to their approach at 
some instances. For a closer investigation on the Anglophone Uno School’s method, see Ch. 4  of my 
forthcoming volume Value without Fetish: Uno’s Kōzō’s Theory of Pure Capitalism in Light of The Marxian 
Critique of Political Economy (Historical Materialism Book Series/Brill).
4  Arthur 2004, p. 7.
5  As for a discussion of the term or label the ‘New Dialectic’, see the ‘Introduction: 
The New Turn to Dialectic’,  in Arthur 2004, pp. 1- 16. ‘The term ‘‘the New Dialectic’’ in the title was 
originally coined by me in a review, and it has since been widely used in the sense I intended, namely 
to refer to literature sharing certain common themes, but which does not take the form of a definite 
‘school’. Rather it is a convenient way of grouping together
 thinkers of independent spirit, clearly doing something rather distinctive in the present 
intellectual
 conjuncture. It has already been made the occasion of robust criticism from John 
Rosenthal, who labelled
 it ‘new Hegelian Marxism’. As we shall see, many of the most active researchers believe 
they are work-
 ing within a new paradigm they call ‘Systematic Dialectic’, but the tendency I label ‘new’ is 
more comprehensive and includes those who still think Hegel’s philosophy of history has something 
to offer (e.g. Joe
 McCarney).’ Arthur 2004, p. 1.
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
Hegel’s text as well as a non-acknowledgement of research that has made 
outstanding contributions to the difficult topic of Hegel’s method in the 
last decades. This unawareness of past and more recent international 
research in Hegel studies also affects the main gist of the homology-
thesis which, as will be shown, renders the categorial applicability of 
‘Hegel to Marx’ meaningless or evades the actual performance of such an 
application.6
Characteristic of Arthur’s ‘New Dialectic’ approach is the ignorance 
of the international, but predominantly German Hegel reception of the 
last 40 years7 that has made groundbreaking contributions to a theory of 
dialectic and to category-theory, to a systematisation of the antinomical 
structure of the concept and to the problem of the semantic-pragmatic 
presupposition (semantisch-pragmatischer Präsuppositionsbegriff) of the 
scientific exposition, as discussed in Hegel’s programmatic introduction 
to the Logic, ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’ (‘Womit 
muss der Anfang der Wissenschaften gemacht werden?’) and in the Section 
on ‘Quality’ in the first part of Volume One of the Logic, the Doctrine 
of Being.8  Especially the approaches by Michael Theunissen (1980), 
Thomas Kesselring (1981), and Dieter Wandschneider (1995) argue from 
an informed background both in classical epistemological, metaphysical, 
as well as in logical-mathematical philosophical discourse to which 
references are astonishingly missing from Arthur’s ‘New Dialectic’, and 
which thereby also misses to situate Hegel in his own scientific context.9  
6  I agree here with Jacques Bidet’s verdict of the New Dialectic (Arthur) and the 
(Anglophone) Uno School: ‘ … not only do these two interpretations of Capital ‘’in the light of Hegel’s 
Logic’’ lack any rigorous connection, but the correspondences they respectively assume are strictly 
incompatible.’ Bidet 2005, 123. I differ however from Bidet’s evaluation with regard to the particular 
way in which Hegel’s method influenced Marx’s exposition in Capital.
7  Important contributions to a theory of dialectic have been made by Dieter 
Wandschneider (1995), Thomas Kesselring (1984), and Michael Theunissen (1980). The most eminent 
German Hegel scholar, Dieter Henrich, has also widely contributed to the problem of the negation at 
the beginning of the Logic, as have Klaus Hartmann (Arthur mentions him once), Otto Pöggeler and 
Hans Friedrich Fulda. Vittorio Hösle has published an influential and original approach to ‘Hegel’s 
System’ in two volumes. The latter figures, notwithstanding their importance for a philosophical 
understanding of Hegel’s method, cannot be considered here. A survey of the German literature on 
Hegel’s method in the Logic is provided in the bibliography, though it is by no means exhaustive.
8  I will use here and throughout the text my own translation of the Logic, the 
Encyclopedia, and, where necessary, the Phenomenology of Spirit, except where otherwise indicated, 
referring to the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel’s Werke, see Hegel 1986. 
9  Large parts of the Logic were written in direct reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, especially the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ that Hegel discusses extensively in the second 
chapter of the Doctrine of Being, ‘Quantity’. References to Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling and other 
lesser known figures of early German Idealism are constantly referred to throughout this work and 
Hegel derives important insights from his direct predecessors and contemporaries (e.g., Hegel’s 
discussion of the ‘I’ to form the ‘beginning of the sciences’ is a direct rejection of Fichte’s intellectual 
intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung)). Notwithstanding the fact that the architecture of the Logic 
is in wide parts directly informed by these debates, this unfortunately does not seem to concern 
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Indeed, as we will see in a brief sketch of Wandschneider’s, Kesselring’s 
and Theunissen’s respective contributions that Hegel’s method is 
indeed more complex than Arthur suggests. In this essay therefore, I 
will undertake an evaluation of mainly Arthur’s work The New Dialectic 
and Marx’s Capital which addresses its crucial shortcomings not only 
with regard to Hegel’s method in the Logic, but also with regard to his 
understanding of the critical implications of Marx’s Capital. 
Arthur’s approach presents us with a veritably ambitious 
project to demonstrate the conceptual, objective, and methodological 
correspondences in the conceptual dialectic between Marx’s Capital, and 
within it, especially the exposition of the value form, and Hegel’s Science 
of Logic. Arthur even believes that the presentation of the value form in 
Capital vol. 1 and Hegel’s Logic ‘are to be identified; we are not simply 
applying Hegel’s logic to an independent content’10 and goes so far as to 
claim that the ‘forms’ of value ‘are in effect of such abstract purity as to 
constitute a real incarnation of the ideas of Hegel’s logic.’11  However, just 
as the presentation is veritably ambitious, it comes with (at least) three 
veritable problems, which will be hitherto addressed and then specified 
in each single case. For systematicity, the first problem concerns 
Arthur’s reading of Marx, the second concerns his reading of Hegel, and 
– dialectically – the third concerns the sublation of Marx in Hegel that 
Arthur in my view undertakes with his research programme. However, 
the reader should be informed from the outset that no such thing is 
intended as a standard defense of Marx’s ‘materialist’ standpoint versus 
Hegel’s ‘petty idealism’ ; nor do I intend to play the card of the offended 
Hegelian who sees his elevated conceptual purity in danger because of 
the application of an ‘impure’ (economy-critical) content. I aim to deliver 
a defense of Marx’s value theory in my understanding of what can be 
named ‘Marx’s own terms’, and a reading of Hegel that is also informed 
by the German reception, especially with regard to theories of dialectic 
that have evolved around the scholars mentioned above, and which Arthur 
unfortunately does not take notice of. 
The three problems in Arthur’s research programme are, needless 
to say, closely entwined, but the exposition of each of them will help to 
analyse the scope of how deeply they penetrate each other.
The first problem concerns Arthur’s critique of the methodological 
setting of abstract labour (or „labour“ in Arthur’s diction –  he often 
Arthur’s New Dialectic-approach. I can only briefly point at this gap, yet for systematic reasons (and, 
obviously, reasons of space) cannot fill it within this essay.
10  Arthur 2004, p. 82.
11  Arthur 2004, p. 82.
omits this important qualifier) as value substance, and of the labour 
theory of value at the beginning of Capital.12 It will be argued that Arthur’s 
methodological reconstruction of Capital’s architecture, dismissing the 
labour theory of value as premature within the presentational architecture 
or as altogether wrong13, leads to a misrepresentation of both the 
expositional intent of Capital’s beginning, as well as the critical project 
of Capital as a critique of the fetish-characteristic forms that value takes, 
and its presentation in classical political economy as a whole. The 
second problem in Arthur’s interpretation, as will be shown, concerns his 
method of adopting specific terms of Hegel’s Logic of Being (1812), Logic 
of Essence (1813) and Logic of the Concept  (1816) to specific theorems in 
the first five chapters (but not all of them, as will be shown) in Capital. 
The third problem concerns the possibility of a real application of Marx 
to Hegel, especially a) the question of a counterpart to the conceptual 
status of Marx’s fetish paradigm in Hegel’s Logic, and the equally 
important question if b) Marx’s critical impetus has a complement that 
can be determined in Hegel’s oeuvre. 
2. „Leaving aside...any labour content“ - Arthur’s critique of 
abstract labour as value substance and the labour theory of value 
in Chapter 1 of Capital
Arthur’s claim that ‘labour’ as value substance is prematurely 
introduced and not proved in the methodological exposition of 
the beginning of Capital is one of the central paradigms of his 
reinterpretation:
 ‘… I differ here from Marx in that I refuse to find it necessary 
to come to labour until after conceptualising capital as a form-
determination. Bringing in labour too early risks giving the 
appearance of model-building and committing the exposition to a 
stage of simple commodity production.’14 
As I will show however, this claim is difficult to defend precisely 
from a Hegelian standpoint – a standpoint that Marx, as I will argue, 
adopts. Let us first give an overview of Hegel’s exposition and choice of 
12  Here, in the first pages of the first chapter, ‘The Commodity’, the first definition 
of the labour theory of value is to be found: ‘A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value 
only because abstract human labour is objectified [vergegenständlicht] or materialized in it. How, 
then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? By means of the quantity of the ‘value-forming 
substance’, the labour, contained in the article. This quantity is measured by its duration, and the 
labour-time is itself measured on the particular scale of hours, days etc.’ Marx 1976, p. 129. 
13  See Arthur 2004, p. 155: ‘The two major schools that claim to be able peremptorily 
to reduce ‘’value’’ to a definite content are those adhering to the labour theory of value and to the 
marginal utility theory.’ 
14  Arthur 2004, p. 85. This passage will be discussed in more detail below.
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
240 241
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
thematic structure at the beginning of the Logic, an issue we will return 
to in the later discussion. Hegel has made clear in the introduction 
to his Science of Logic (1812), in which he emphatically discusses the 
methodological structure and categorial exposition, that there can be 
no such thing as an ‘unmediated’ beginning.15  The (im)possibility of a 
‘pure beginning’ in the metaphysical science of logic therefore becomes 
the first theme of Hegel’s exposition. This choice of thematic informs 
the dialectic (in the precise sense) of the relation between immediacy 
(Unvermitteltheit) and mediation (Vermittlung, Vermitteltheit), to become 
reflected in the first categories of the Logic, ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’. 
In other words, for the beginning to be a real beginning (ein „wahrer 
Anfang“), the dialectic of immediacy and mediation (or „mediated-
ness“, „Vermitteltheit“) of the beginning itself becomes thematic as the 
first dialectical relation. We will come back to this point in more detail. 
What we can say for now is that with regard to the supposed ‘pure’ and 
immediate/unmediated beginning of the exposition, Hegel criticises 
previous methodological attempts that thematise a ‘known’ fact as the 
immediate, and simultaneously distances himself from hypothesising 
such an ‘immediacy’ as the beginning.16 He goes on to argue that the 
attempt to think the notion of immediacy is necessarily bound to be the 
result of mediation:
‘Here the beginning is made with being which is represented 
as having come to be through mediation, a mediation which is 
also a sublating of itself; and there is presupposed pure knowing 
as the outcome of finite knowing, of consciousness. But if no 
presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken 
immediately, then its only determination is that it is to be the 
beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is present is simply 
the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we 
propose to consider thought as such.’17
Note that for Hegel, the choice of category for the beginning has 
an ‘arbitrary’ character: the category of Being cannot by and out of itself 
deliver its own justification as to why it makes the beginning. After all, 
it should be a pure, presupposition-less concept, but this will show to 
be a fallacy. And yet, this has to be seen in hindsight. For now, we have 
to make do with dissatisfactory determinations. At the level of method, 
however, this constellation is rich in information: the dialectical method 
15  It is evident from this alone that Hegel’s Logic has a ‘critical function’ 
(Theunissen), but not in the sense that Arthur thinks. For some preliminary remarks on the Logic’s 
critical funtion, see the end of this essay. 
16  Hegel 1986b, p. 74-5. 
17  Hegel 1986b, p. 68. Emphasis EL.
shows how and to what extent the semantic as well as pragmatic cleft is 
always presupposed in the categories: it shows how the concept of ‘being’ 
could never mean (with regard to its semantic content) what it designates 
(with regard to the pragmatic object addressed) –  though for more clarity, 
we will return to this point in greater detail.  From this generally however 
follows a specific preference for the categories of Being and Nothingness 
to make up the beginning of the dialectical movement: in their supposed 
‘pure’ immediacy, they show themselves to be mediated, for they are 
unthinkable as such (immediate) ‘determinations’. In fact, for Hegel it is 
fundamental to think determinations of immediacy as a contradiction in 
terms: if categories are determinable, they have ceased to be ‘immediate’ 
or ‘pure’, and if they are ‘immediate’ or ‘pure’, we will not be able to think 
(determine) them. Here is also the reason why the ‘purest’ categories 
are already categories of reflection: ‘Simple immediacy is itself an 
expression of reflection and contains a reference to its distinction 
from what is mediated. This simple immediacy, therefore, in its true 
expression is pure being.’ 18 But from the realisation of this ‘falseness’ 
of immediacy, the dialectical movement can begin in its precise sense: 
Being and Nothingness hence cannot remain in their pure state and fall 
into Becoming, the ‘immediate synthesis of Being and Nothingness’19  
as the next category. How this ‘impossibility’ of Being and Nothingness 
must be comprehended will be shown in the later discussion, referring to 
Kesselring and Wandschneider.
At the same time, the whole movement of thought as presented in 
the Logic is bound to culminate in the Idea, resp. the Concept in which 
‘uncomprehended’ reality is finally comprehended (begriffen). In the 
Idea, the imperfect thought-forms rise to their own reasonability in their 
truth, moving beyond intelligence (Verstand) and reflection (which is 
always polemically used against Kant’s system). Here is the dialectical 
nexus between the concept of Being, ‘such a poor and restricted 
determination’20, and the richest determination of the Idea, while the Idea 
itself ‘divests’ (entäußert) itself back into immediacy: 
‘Only the Concept is what is true, and, more precisely, it is the 
truth of Being and of Essence. So each of these, if they are clung to 
in their isolation, or by themselves, must be considered at the
18  Hegel 1986b, p. 68.
19  Hegel 1986b, p. 100.
20  Hegel 2010, p. 699.
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same time as untrue – Being because it is still only what is 
immediate, and Essence because it is still only what is  m e d i a t 
e d . At this point, we could at once raise the question why, if that 
is the case, we should begin with what is untrue and why we do not 
straightaway begin with what is true. The answer is that the truth 
must, precisely as such, validate itself and here, within logical 
thinking itself, validation consists in the Concept’s showing itself to 
be what is mediated through and with itself, so that it shows itself 
to be at the s a m e time the genuinely immediate.’21
In other words, Hegel shows at the end of his Logic, that the Idea, 
the comprehended and perfectly mediated Truth at the end of the process 
is to be relegated to pure immediacy of Being of the Logic’s beginning 
: ‘This result (Truth or The Idea) has given itself again the form of 
immediacy as the whole which has returned to itself in its self-sameness. 
Therefore it is of the same kind as the beginning (das Anfangende) 
has determined itself.’22 . Consequently, as already indicated, Hegel 
makes clear from the outset that pure being is already mediated from 
the standpoint of the whole from which only it can be thought.23 To think 
pure being as unmediated, is likewise itself an abstraction (or ‘onesided-
ness’, Einseitigkeit) from the process of mediation pure being has already 
gone through from the standpoint of the whole. 24  Needless to say, 
Hegel’s system forms a circle as the perfect scientific method, in which 
Objectivity (Inhalt) and Form or Subjectivity are to be identified. I will 
come back to the point of the ‘circle’ of scientific thought in a while.
These short reflections should only mark the setting for a better 
understanding of Arthur’s position in which the above connection is not 
addressed, and shall be elaborated on in more detail in the next section. 
The issue at stake is that with regard to the necessary structural and 
21  Hegel 1991, p. 134.
22  Hegel 1986c, p. 566.
23  Nicole Pepperell in her close reading of Hegel’s method in light of Marx’s critique 
has pointed to the same dialectic between the methodologically necessary presuppositions and 
the standpoint of the whole by which the presupposition is ‘sublated’: ‘ … a philosophical system 
is scientific, for Hegel, to the extent that it can justify its own point of departure by showing how 
the relations between the various elements of this system could have been revealed only from that 
particular starting point, and thus that the starting point is reflexively implied by the entire network of 
relations. In this way, the starting point that initially looks arbitrary and dogmatic is demonstrated to 
have been immanently necessary all along, even if the basis for this necessity becomes explicit only 
once the system as a whole is known.’ Pepperell 2010, p. 137.
24  Hegel 1986b, p. 72: ‘Pure being is the unity to which pure knowledge (reines 
Wissen) returns, or, if it still has to be differentiated as form from its own unity, it is also its content. 
This is the side on which this pure being, as the absolute-immediate, is likewise the absolutely 
mediated. But it will have to be essentially taken only in this one-sidedness to be the pure-immediate 
(das Rein-Unmittelbare), precisely because it is as the beginning.’ 
methodological presupposition of the determination of abstract labour 
as the substance of value, Marx followed the same method as Hegel. 
Marx, like every critical thinker after Hegel, was well aware that there is 
no such thing as ‘presupposition-less thought’ (voraussetzungsloses 
Denken). Like Hegel, Marx knew that the starting point of the exposition 
must always-already be mediated by heavily burdened conceptual 
presuppositions. The point for him was not to deny that the pivotal 
concepts come with pragmatic and semantic baggage, but on the contrary 
to show that the idea of a pure exposition necessarily falls into ideological 
abyss.25 I will demonstrate how Arthur gets seduced by the allure of 
conceptual-theoretical ‘purity’ and its vicissitudes by demonstrating 
that the beginning of his own presentation of the application of Hegel’s 
categories to value form analysis indeed abounds with presuppositions – 
quite contrary to its alleged purity, and, consequently, contrary to Arthur’s 
own methodological claims.
I contend that Marx presented the very first determinations, the 
commodity and its value, in such a way that its essential content – 
abstract labour and the determination of value as the socially necessary 
labour time needed to produce a commodity in the social average – would 
impress itself as the compelling heuristic tool or the analytical basis 
not only for the first three chapters or the middle part of Vol. 1, but the 
complete analysis of the economic laws of movement of modern society 
that Capital is comprised of. The labour theory of value is therefore 
the key heuristic tool to unravel the fetishised forms in which value 
presents itself through its own movement. In its forms of appearance, 
an increasing obfuscation takes place in the economic categories that 
appear on the surface: whereas the commodity, money, and capital still 
show remnants of their origin in abstract labour – no matter how faintly26 
- , the relation is increasingly obscured by the time the analysis reaches 
the concept of profit and commercial capital, and finally completed in 
the economic concept of interest-bearing capital where ‘the capital 
25  To this methodological ‘dialectic’ Marx pointed also in the ‘Results of the 
Immediate Process of Production’: ‘As the elementary form of bourgeois wealth, the commodity was 
our point of departure, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital. On the other hand, commodities 
appear now as the product of capital. … if we consider societies where capitalist production is highly 
developed, we find that the commodity is both the constant elementary premiss (precondition) 
of capital and also the immediate result of the capitalist process of production.’ Marx bases this 
argument on the historical emergence of capitalism. Marx 1976, p. 949.
26  See also this passage from the Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy: ‘It is only through the habit of everyday life that we come to think of it perfectly plain 
and commonplace, that a social relation of production should take on the form of a thing, so that 
the relation of persons in their work appears in the form of a mutual relation between things, and 
between things and persons. In commodities, this mystification is as yet very simple. It is more or 
less plain to everybody that a relation of commodities as exchange values is nothing but a mutual 
relation between persons in their productive activity. This semblance of simplicity disappears in 
higher productive relations.’ Marx 1904 (1859), p. 37. 
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relationship reaches its most superficial and fetishized form.’27Marx’s 
self-imposed task was to disclose the fetishistic forms of value and 
ground them in abstract labour as the substance of value in order to show 
and criticise the appropriation of surplus labour as surplus value by the 
capitalist ‘without equivalent’.28 
Accordingly, the labour theory of value by methodological necessity 
runs like a golden thread through Capital from beginning to end. For 
example, there could not be a calculus of the rate of profit as the relation 
of surplus value to the capital advanced, if we did not understand that 
value is determined as socially necessary labour time in a social average, 
nor could there be an understanding of ‘surplus’ at all: a surplus of what? 
What is needed is a theory of value in terms of value, not in terms of use 
value or (marginal) utility. As Fred Moseley puts it in his criticism against 
Arthur’s determination of labour as value substance in terms of use 
value:
‘Marx’s argument in Chapter 6 of volume 1 about the necessity 
of labor-power is solely in terms of value. Marx argued that, in order 
to expand in value, capital must be able to purchase on the market 
a commodity which is the source of additional value (not a source 
of additional use-values). It follows from Marx’s theory of value 
developed in Chapter 1 (that labor is the sole source of additional 
value), that this special commodity which capital requires can only 
be labour power. If one had a different theory of value, then perhaps 
one could explain capital’s expanding value in a different way. 
However, in order to explain how capital expands in value, one needs 
at least some theory of value. Since Chris [Arthur] has rejected 
Marx’s theory of value in Chapter 1, he has no theory of value with 
which to explain capital’s expansion of value.’29 
27  Marx 1981, p. 515. Marx further elaborates on the ‘completed fetish’ of interest-
bearing capital : ‘There is still a further distortion. While interest is simply one part of the profit, i.e. 
the surplus -value, extorted from the worker by the functioning capitalist, it now appears conversely 
as if interest is the specific fruit of capital, the original thing, while profit, now transformed into the 
form of profit of enterprise, appears as a mere accessory and trimming added in the reproduction 
process. The fetish character of capital and the representation of this capital fetish is now complete.’ 
The increasing mystification taking place in the movement of value will be discussed in more detail 
below.
28  Marx 1976, p. 730. This process is most impressively demonstrated in Capital vol. 
II in the chapters on ‘Simple Reproduction’  and ‘Accumulation and Reproduction on an Expanded 
Scale’. Here at the latest Marx’s reveals the illusion of ‘equal exchange between capital and labour’.  
29  Moseley 1997, p. 11. Emphasis added. Moseley here specifically refers to Arthur’s 
argument in Moseley 1993, p. 84-5: ‘What then is the condition next required to grant necessity to 
the existence of capital as self-valorization? ... It is here that we remember that at the outset we 
stated that a primary condition of exchange is the world of use-values. With capital we reach a form 
of circulation of commodities that is its own end, but the self-valorization process still rests for its 
possibility on the emergence into being of the goods themselves from some external source...The 
problem is solved if the goods are themselves produced by capital and reduced to moments in its 
However, it is equally substantial that, methodologically, a ‘proof’ 
of value at the beginning is impossible. With Hegel’s expositional 
methodology that Marx adopts (and in the famous letter to Kugelmann 
of July 186830), I think we can see why. Only in the end of the analysis, 
in the chapter on the Trinity Formula (the fetishisation of wages, profit 
and ground as the ‘three sources of wealth’ in the theory of Adam Smith 
and his ‘vulgarising’ followers), can we understand why and how the 
labour theory of value is the secret to the fetishism that value and its 
manifestation in money bring about, and of which equivalent exchange is 
its first superficial appearance. This methodological move is indeed close 
to Hegel’s circular motion in which the Idea, the final totality of cognition, 
in the end accordingly ‘gives itself again the form of immediacy’ in the 
context of the Being and Nothingness-dialectic: but this presupposition 
cannot be enunciated in the beginning. This nexus cannot be expressed as 
of yet. We find the same level of abstraction and gradual approximation 
towards the more complex and complete determination in Capital.  
With this arguably uncontroversial diagnosis in mind, it is 
indeed strange that Arthur should embark on a mission to disavow the 
methodological place of the labour theory of value in Ch. 1 of Vol. 1 of 
Capital:  ‘[…] in concentrating on the value form I leave aside initially 
any labour content – in this way departing from Marx who analysed both 
together.’31 ‘Before the positing of labour as ‘’abstract’’, there is the 
positing of commodities themselves as bearers of their abstract identity 
as values.’32 Arthur even goes to suggest that the alleged premature 
introduction of ‘labour’ (not, correctly, abstract labour) leads to the 
originally Engelsian interpretation of simple commodity production, albeit 
without giving an argument for this.33 Let’s recall Arthur’s basic argument:
own circuit...The activity of production is an activity of labor. Hence, capital must make that activity 
its own activity. Only now does the presentation find it necessary to address labor. The limitlessness 
of accumulation inherent in the form of capital is given a solid ground in productive labor.’ Emphasis 
added.
30   ‘Considering ‘Centralblatt’, that man makes the biggest possible concession 
when he admits that if you think of value as anything at all, my conclusions are correct. The poor 
chap won’t see that if there were indeed no chapter on ‘value’ in my book, the analysis of the really 
existing relations that I provide would contain the proof and evidence of the real value relation ... 
That blather about the necessity to prove the concept of value is based on complete ignorance, both 
about the matter under discussion as about the scientific method. Every child knows that any nation 
that stopped working –  I don’t want to say for a year, but only for a couple of weeks –  would perish 
miserably (verrecken) … Science is all about developing just how the law of value prevails.’ Marx 1961, 
p. 552-3.  
31  Arthur 2004, pp. 79-80.
32  Arthur 2004, p. 80.
33  There is a footnote to this argument which says: ‘For a critique of such mistakes, 
see Chapter 2.’ In Chapter 2, Arthur – correctly, in my view – criticises the idea of simple commodity 
production bare and simple, but he forgets to prove the assumption that addressing labour ‘too early’ 
will lead to the Engelsian interpretation of simple commodity production. Therefore, he does nowhere 
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
246 247
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
‘To begin with we shall analyse the commodity form itself 
and only at the end give grounds for picking out as systematically 
important those commodities which are products of labour.’34
Arthur in his insistence that the ‘pure forms’ of capital should be 
studied first – and especially ‘the value form (as the germ of capital)’ 
before its ‘grounding in labour’35 is analysed –  claims that starting 
with exchange brings certain advantages: ‘[…] the question of form 
is so crucial that the presentation starts with the form of exchange, 
bracketing entirely the question of the mode of production [sic], if any, of 
the objects of exchange.36 This has the advantage that we begin with the 
same perception as that of everyday consciousness, namely, that in the 
bourgeois epoch nearly everything is capable of taking on commodity-
form, and we avoid an appearance of arbitrariness in concentration 
from the outset only on products of labour.’37 This passage  - Arthur’s 
insistence that in order to fully concentrate on the social form, we need 
to bracket ‘entirely the question of the mode of production’ – invites the 
suspicion that he conflates social form with commodity exchange, for it is 
give an argument for this contention. 
34  Arthur 2004, p. 85. In this passage, he also suggests that Marx was not right 
in subsuming all commodities to being ‘products of labour’. This is an argument which in my view 
both Patrick Murray and Fred Moseley have already successfully refuted. See Murray 2005,  esp. 
pp. 76-79 and Moseley (1997), p. 9: ‘Chris [Arthur’s] … criticism of Marx is that, even if the postulate 
of the values of commodities is accepted, Marx did not prove that labor must be the substance of 
value, and in particular Marx arbitrarily excluded commodities which are not products of labor (like 
land) from his deduction. … My response [is] that it ignores key elements of Marx’s overall logical 
method. According to Marx’s method, the price of land is explain by Marx on the basis of the rent of 
land, i.e. on the basis of the future expectations of rent or ‘’capitalized’’ rent. Rent itself is explained 
in Part 6 of Volume 3 as one part of the total amount of surplus-value (along with other parts of 
surplus-value such as interest, commercial profit, etc.). According to Marx’s logical method (as I 
have emphasized in several recent papers), the total amount of surplus-value is determined prior 
to its division into the individual parts of rent, interest, etc. The determination of the total amount 
of surplus-value is the main subject of Volume 1 of Capital (the analysis of capital in general). The 
individual parts of surplus-value (or the distribution of surplus-value) are then explained in Volume 3 
(an abstract analysis of competition) on the basis of the assumption that the total amount of surplus-
value has already been determined. Therefore, according to Marx’s method, the price of land cannot 
be explained in Chapter 1 of Volume 1. Instead, land and the price of land are “abstracted from” in 
Volume 1 (just as are the other individual parts of the total surplus-value), and then explained at 
a more concrete level of analysis in Volume 3. These important aspects of Marx’s logical method 
were overlooked by Boehm-Bawerk, and by almost everybody else since, apparently including Chris 
[Arthur].’ 
35  Arthur 2006, p. 10.
36  Note here that by ‘bracketing entirely … the mode of production’, Arthur himself 
invites the possibility of a pre- or non-capitalist society as the object of Marx’s study. From the outset, 
Marx’s object however is the capitalist mode of production as Arthur admits in other places. His 
rebuttal of the labour theory of value and the structural relation between value, abstract labour and 
money for the beginning of Capital brings forth consequences Arthur himself seems to be unaware of. 
That Arthur succumbs to the ‘logical-historical’ approach that he elsewhere criticises (see Ch. 2) has 
also been noticed by Bidet, see Bidet 2005, p. 129 ff. 
37  Arthur 2004, p. 86.
illogical to imply that ‘proper attention to social form requires bracketing 
production’, as Patrick Murray has in my view correctly objected, asking: 
‘Is not production form-determined by value?’38 However, social form 
also implies production and is neither conceptually, nor systematically, 
completely absorbed by the concept of commodity exchange. 
The desideratum to start with ‘everyday consciousness’ is 
also problematic in a different aspect of Marx’s critique of fetishism. 
Methodologically, Marx lays his cards on the table by introducing not only 
the ‘fetish-character of the commodity’, but also revealing its secret (that 
many commentators seem to ignore). The secret to the fetish-character 
is explicitly defined in Marx’s labour theory of value, as early as in the 
first chapter of Capital. The critical disclosure of the continuous increase 
of mystification and the inverted relation of appearance and essence, as 
reflected in the economic categories, is that which Marx’s analysis aims at:
‘… in the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange 
relations between products, the labour time socially necessary to 
produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature. In the 
same way, the Law of Gravity asserts itself when a person’s house 
collapses on top of him. The determination of the magnitude of 
value by labour-time is therefore a secret hidden under the apparent 
movements in the relative values of commodities.’39
And here, I contend, lies precisely the power of Marx’s critique: 
by giving us, the interested reader, a hermeneutical and critical tool at 
hand by which to decipher and disclose the growing mystification taking 
place in conventional economical categories right at the start of the 
presentation.40 This mystification or fetishism is both one of ‘science’, 
as well as of the agents in the daily capitalist mode of production and 
circulation. However, the fetishism of commodities, of which its secret 
lies in the ‘determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time’, or 
the labour theory of value, as Marx clearly spells out41, is in Arthur’s view 
‘too hastily’ related to labour: ‘(Marx) has a critique of form (fetishism) 
38  Murray 2005, p. 72.
39  Marx 1976a, p. 168. Emphasis added. 
40  This invokes the idea that, while Hegel’s movement of the concept is the 
liberation from a false consciousness (predominantly corresponding to his method in the PhG), 
Marx’s presentation shows the opposite movement of the (economic) concepts towards an increasing 
mystification falling prey to fetishism and ideology, with the Trinity Formula at the end as the 
fetishised consciousness’ ‘cherry on top’. We will discuss this in more detail in the last section of this 
essay.
41  Section 4 of the first Chapter of Capital volume 1 is titled: ‘The Fetishism of 
the Commodity and its Secret’, not just ‘The Fetishism of the Commodity’ as one often gets the 
impression even in literature dealing exclusively with the fetishism paradigm. See e.g. Geras (1971), 
Böhme (1997), Dimoulis and Milios (1999).
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as well as a critique of content (exploitation); but in his anxiety to relate 
value to production he had already jumped – far too hastily – to labour 
as its substance.’42 This sounds as though Marx’s decision to present 
abstract labour as the substance of value, indeed, to be so notorious 
as to ‘dive down from the phenomena of exchange-value to labour as 
the substance of value in the first three pages of Capital’43 is a sloppy, 
or indeed, ‘hasty’, but at least a very careless methodological move. Yet 
again, nothing could be further from the truth. For Marx, value is not only 
vaguely ‘related’ to the production process, it is its outcome, its ‘truth’ 
in the precise Hegelian sense of the ‘comprehended Idea’. As such, the 
production process is necessarily presupposed. Marx himself has time 
and again indicated that in the presentation of his object, the capitalist 
mode of production and reproduction,  ‘ … the categories express forms 
of being, determinations of existence – and sometimes only individual 
aspects – of this particular society, of this subject, and that even from the 
scientific standpoint it therefore by no means begins at the moment when 
it is first discussed as such’44  – namely, in its superficial presentations 
of equivalent exchange. Marx makes very clear that to begin with the 
circulation of commodities sans phrase cannot ‘as such’ represent a 
pure, unconditioned categorial presentation of Capital. Circulation 
presupposes commodity production – not just in ‘reality’, but also in 
its scientific representation. Even more so, ‘the autonomous sphere of 
exchange’ is a direct expression of mystification:
‘An analysis of the specific form of the division of labour, 
of the conditions of production on which it rests, of the economic 
relations of the members of society within which these relations 
are dissolved, would show that the whole system of bourgeois 
production is implied, so that exchange value can appear as the 
simple point of departure on the surface, and the exchange process, 
as it presents itself in simple circulation, can appear as the simple 
social metabolism, which nevertheless encompasses the whole 
of production as well as consumption. It would then result from 
this that other entangled relations of production which more or 
less collide with the freedom and independence of the individuals 
and the economic relations of those, are implied, so that they can 
appear as free private producers in the simple relation of buyers 
and sellers within the circulation process. From the standpoint of 
circulation, however, these relations are obliterated.’45
42  Arthur 2004, p. 87.
43  Arthur 2004, p. 12.
44  Marx 1986, p. 43.
45  Marx 1987, p. 466.
Hence, ‘The Commodity’, or rather its value form, like the Hegelian 
Idea, is discussed as the result of a process that will yet have to be 
analysed, but is simultaneously presupposed. It is the task of the Critique 
of Political Economy to unravel the ‘inner connection’ (‘inneres Band’)  
between the forms (value, the commodity, money, capital) as how they 
present themselves to our ‘everyday consciousness’ –  in exchange or 
circulation – and their real content, springing from the ‘hidden abode of 
production’. This is why, as Jacques Bidet has correctly emphasised, all 
the categories of the market (private property, production for exchange, 
the commodity division of labour, concrete and abstract labour (!), 
productivity, socially necessary labour that the market identified within a 
branch as average labour and between branches as abstract labour) ‘are 
already those forming the framework of the formulations and arguments 
of Volume 1, Chapter One.’46
  An attitude which holds that commodity exchange must be 
analysed separately falls itself prey to the fetishism of the forms of 
appearance. It is therefore not only dubious, but methodologically 
unfeasible to analyse the production process ‘before the grounding of 
value in labour is legitimate.’47 It is unfeasible, because the organisation 
of the labour and production process is necessarily based upon value and 
surplus-value. To unhinge the necessary correlation between abstract 
labour, value and money would undermine Marx’s critical framework 
right from the outset. In this sense, Arthur’s remark that ‘[w]hen 
capital attempts to ground itself on production, it runs into economic 
determination springing from use value. This should have dethroned 
value; but instead the opposite happens; the spectre prevails’48 is 
characteristic for his misrecognition of Marx’s critical method. He not 
only muddles the levels of a scientific presentation with that of the object 
of critique – capital is to be grounded on production precisely because 
from its expositional analysis follows that use value is peripheral to the 
production process, which is also its critique –, but is indicative of ‘bad 
46  Bidet 2005, p. 128.
47  Arthur 2006, p. 10. Arthur’s claim that „capitalist production must be theorised 
before the grounding of value in labour is legitimate“  - to paraphrase: capitalist production must 
be theorised before we can know how to theorise it – is, apart from its analytical Marxist undertone, 
astoundingly un-Hegelian. Like Kant’s project of examining the faculties of cognition before having 
cognition at all, it would be a petitio principii, as Hegel has shown: ‚But to want to have cognition 
before we have any is as absurd as the wise resolve of Scholasticus to learn to swim before he 
ventured into the water.‘ (Hegel 1991, p. 34)  But here is where Arthur agrees with the Uno School: 
‚Like them (the Uno School) I think that the introduction by Marx of a posited ground for labour before 
the form of value is fully theorised represents a residue of classical political ecnomy.‘ (ibid.) This 
argument is, strictly speaking, absurd. Classical political economy has nowhere made the disctinction 
between concrete and abstract human labour, of which only the latter, as Marx intends to show in the 
opening pages of Capital, is productive of value. Therefore the definition of abstract human labour as 
the social substance of value is precisely what distinguishes Marx from classical political economy.
48  Arthur 2004, p. 168.
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
250 251
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
abstraction’, as Patrick Murray rightly complains.49 Arthur’s claim is 
furthermore dubious, because the content of the later chapters cannot be 
understood in abstraction from any of the conditions that Marx unfolds in 
the first four chapters. One may ask: would it be less of a presupposition if 
the labour theory of value were only presented at the outset of Chapter 6? 
But there are reasonable doubts for introducing it only here, because just 
as at the beginning, one yet cannot understand why the value substance 
should be abstract labour. If indeed Marx had decided to present his value 
form analysis without making any reference to labour50, we would have 
understood that value is ‘necessarily’ presented in money: but we would 
not have understood why51: we would not have understood that money is 
an already fetishised form of value in which its relation to the expenditure 
of human labour as abstract labour is obfuscated. 
Arthur admits in a different passage that the presentation of 
the Hegelian method as a dialectical exposition of categories in their 
necessary inner coherence contains a moment of presupposition: ‘Thus 
in a dialectical argument the meanings of concepts undergo shifts 
because the significance of any element in the total picture cannot 
be concretely defined at the outset.’52 Arthur also correctly sees that 
Hegel’s exposition ‘is the logical development of a system of categories, 
or forms of being, from the most elementary and indeterminate to 
the richest and most concrete’53 and that, accordingly, value ‘is to be 
understood only in its forms of development.’54 But he fails to engage 
this insight to the context of the methodological position of the labour 
theory of value.  It may be useful to remind us of Hegel’s exposition in 
which he clearly states that pure being is the unity of knowledge with 
itself – knowledge of the concept as self-knowledge: 
49  Murray 2005, p. 73.
50  The concept of ‘labour’ appears 241 times in the first three sections of Capital 
alone.
51  For Kuruma Samezō, ‘why’ a commodity becomes money is the topic of Capital’s 
section on Fetishism in Chapter 1 of vol. 1. See Kuruma 1957, p. 41 and Kuruma 2009, p. 65: ‘Marx is 
raising a theoretical question not posed before. The question involves examining why the value of 
a commodity appears in the form of a quantity of another commodity that is equated to it … rather 
than being directly expressed as a certain quantity of labor-time. In relation to money in particular, 
the theory of the fetish-character analyzes the why of money, whereas the theory of the value-form 
looks at the how of money.’ Murray raises the same point: ‘We want to know not only how it is that 
diverse commodities exchange for one another but also why each has the specific exchange-value 
it does. Because he insists that the value-form is contentless, Arthur’s answer to the first question 
teeters on tautology: commodities are mutually exchangeable because they have the ‘’quality of being 
exchangeable.’’ Murray 2005, p. 72.
52  Arthur 2004. p. 25.
53  Arthur 2004, p. 83.
54  Ibid. 
‘… by considering pure being as the unity with which 
knowledge converges (zusammenfallen) on its highest peak of 
unification with its object, then knowledge has disappeared into 
this unity and has not left no difference from it [i.e. unity] and 
hence no determination of it.’55  
Not only the rhetoric and choice of wording is reminiscent of 
Marx’s summary of the genesis of the money form: ‘The movement 
through which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own 
result, leaving no trace behind.’56 Also the method of exposition is 
presented in this Hegelian fashion to demonstrate the necessity of 
the semantic presupposition taking place at the beginning. What 
exactly does ‘semantic presupposition’ mean in this context, and why 
is it a structurally necessary prerequisite of the logical method? In 
his seminal work on an Outline of a Theory of Dialectic (Grundzüge einer 
Theorie der Dialektik), Dieter Wandschneider examines the discrepancy 
of the semantic and pragmatic function of the concept to argue that 
the semantic-pragmatic ‘cleft’ at the presentation’s beginning is by 
no means a ‘deficient’ mode of presentation, but necessitated by the 
exposition itself, and hence, adhering to the dialectical method as 
developing its own movement from the incomplete to the gradually 
complete by virtue of the categories’ own semantic-pragmatic cleft57:
‘For a theory of dialectic, two aspects seem to be of 
fundamental significance: on the one hand, the view … according 
to which every logical category (with the exception of the 
final determination) contains a semantic-pragmatic discrepancy 
(semantisch-pragmatische Diskrepanz). It consists in the fact that 
the explicit meaning of a category does not express all that is 
implicitly presupposed (präsupponiert) for its meaning. That this 
must be the case immediately makes sense; since in order to 
explicate a particular meaning, the whole apparatus of logical 
categories and principles must be presupposed (vorausgesetzt 
werden). This tension between the semantic content (Gehalt) and 
that which is pragmatically presupposed for the argumentative 
acts (Argumentationsakte) that precede it, necessitates the 
introduction of categories by which this ‘’pragmatic surplus 
meaning’’ is successively further semantically explicated 
[and diminished, EL]. In other words: the semantic-pragmatic 
55  Hegel 1986b, p. 72.
56  Marx 1976, p. 187.
57  Pepperell discusses the semantic-pragmatic-cleft in terms of what is ‘implicit’ 
and ‘explicit’ in a concept. I think this terminology is useful, but the semantic and pragmatic aspects 
determine more specifically ‘what’ is implicit and explicit in a concept. See Pepperell 2010, p. 137.
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
252 253
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
discrepancy contained in a category which, under specific 
conditions, can be exacerbated to a performative contradiction, 
makes the necessity to introduce ever new categories plausible, as 
long as the ‘’pragmatic surplus meaning’’ remains.’58   
The meaning of Being therefore enunciates something that it 
is not: and what Being is not, is Nothingness. Yet, it is nothingness, 
but as such, it is not it, for it should semantically contain a difference 
from nothingness. However, the category of ‘difference’ is by far not 
introduced at this stage of the presentation. While it is pragmatically 
presupposed, pure (or rather, ‘poor’) Being cannot mean itself without 
falling prey to its opposite, Nothingness. At the beginning of the 
Logic therefore, the semantic-pragmatic discrepancy is the greatest. 
We still do not have the semantic means to understand the meaning 
of Being (that, to make matters even more complicated, is of course 
the immediate form of appearance of the Idea) ‘correctly’: the whole 
presentation is presupposed to understand it ‘correctly’, or truthfully.  We 
will see in a while how this reciprocal transition (Umschlagen) from 
one category to the other is the prototype of the antinomical structure 
that motivates the dialectical movement. The point here is to realise 
that the same applies to the beginning of Marx’s Capital, and specifically 
the category of abstract labour which is determined as the substance 
of value: the whole system of derivations is presupposed to thoroughly 
understand it – but this is not a ‘defect’ in Marx’s presentation. It is 
rather the specific anti-dogmatic character of the dialectical mode of 
exposition itself that ‘accompanies’ thought and serves as an aid to 
criticise its own misapprehensions, instead of delivering ready-made 
definitions of concepts in a positivistic sense that, rather than promote 
thought, substitute it.
In so far as the method of Hegel’s Logic is concerned it is therefore 
wrong that Arthur suggests that ‘it is self-evident that the result cannot 
be ‘’contained’’ in the premise, for the latter is poorer in content than the 
former.’59 The result is not only contained in the premise – by virtue of 
the scientific mode of presentation which is necessarily a circle (though 
58  Wandschneider 1995, p. 26. The other ‘aspect of fundamental significance’ for 
the theory of dialectic for Wandschneider is the concept of ‘self-referential negation’ which, for 
systematic reasons, will be discussed in the next section. Wandschneider points out that, in so far as 
the semantic-pragmatic discrepancy is concerned, the works by Wolfgang Wieland (1978) and Vittorio 
Hösle (1987) have been influential also for his position. 
59  Arthur 2004, p. 83. I disagree with Bidet at this point who seems to think that 
Arthur accepts Hegel’s idea of the impossibility of an unmediated beginning:’ … Arthur proposes a 
dialectical mode of exposition, moving simultaneously forward and backward … Only the end defines 
the beginning.’ Bidet 2005, p. 125-6. In contrast, Arthur insists that ‘an absolute beginning without 
imposed conditions is needed.’ Arthur 2004, p. 158.
strictly not circular in the formal-logical sense60), it is its own premise:
‘The essential (das Wesentliche) for science is not so much 
to begin with a pure immediate being, but that the whole shows to 
be a circuit in itself in which the first [determination] will be the last 
and the last will be the first.’61 
 Therefore, Arthur is mistaken to hypostatise that to follow the 
model of Hegel’s dialectic, ‘an absolute beginning without imposed 
conditions is needed.’62 This claim only shows Arthur’s misrecognition 
of the critical intent of the exposition in which the hypostasation of 
an allegedly ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ content is itself shown as a fallacy of 
the intellect. To the contrary, the beginning of the Logic thematises the 
desideratum of ‘purity’ and ‘absoluteness’  - or, as it were, ‘immediacy’ 
– as the fetish of the intellect that is as of yet untouched by the intricate 
operations of conceptual dialectic. The demand to start with purity 
is, in Hegel’s words, an expression of the uncomprehended (‘das 
Unverstandene’) in itself, by virtue of which it must perish.63 
However, there is a yet another profound difficulty lurking behind 
Arthur’s expositional conceptualisation that Jacques Bidet has pointed 
to: by Arthur’s suggestion that ‘[i]f value depends for its reality on 
the full development of capitalist production, then the concepts of 
Marx’s first chapter can only have an abstract character …’64 , he ‘seems 
to confuse two questions.’65 The first is the historical one, and (in this 
context, at least) uncontested: namely that value can only emerge on the 
basis of an already implemented capitalist production and reproduction 
process. Value is therefore an ex post, not an a priori-phenomenon. 
It also involves a vast cataclysm of the juridico-political complex that 
historically accompanies the genesis of capitalist production. But this 
does not concern the second question which is a question of theoretical 
presentation: ‘[Arthur] concludes that, in the course of the exposition, 
60  D. Wandschneider shows that the logical presupposition at the beginning of the 
Logic is precisely not a petitio principii, because in contrast to this ‘circular’ form of argumentation, 
it can account for and define its content: ‘It is decisive that the form of self foundational reasoning 
(Selbstbegründung) [by which is meant the fact that logic/thought/arguments cannot be 
fundamentally doubted except on the grounds of logic/thought/arguments itself, EL], is a foundation 
(Begründung), insofar it is not founded on arbitrary suppositions, but has a logically cogent character. 
Circular reasoning and self foundational reasoning are not the same.’ Wandschneider 1995, p. 19.  
61  Hegel 1986b,  p. 70. Note also that Hegel uses the past tense in this passage 
which for him is a consequence of having already surveyed and grasped the whole development. 
62  Arthur 2004, p. 158.
63  Hegel 1986b, p. 86.
64  Arthur 2004, p. 26.
65  Bidet 2005, p. 130.
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the concept of value cannot be fully developed before the specifically 
capitalist form.’66 This conflation of historical development with the form 
of presentation is accordingly inviting to the ‘logico-historical’ approach 
that Arthur rejects in other places.67
Let us see how Arthur solves the problem of the beginning which, 
while being rich in semantic and pragmatic presuppositions, cannot 
account for those by itself.  
3. The Application of Hegel’s Logic to the Presentation 
of the Value Form 
In this section, I will examine Arthur’s attempt to elucidate the 
methodological structure of Marx’ value form analysis by applying 
it to Hegel’s greater division of the Logic. In it, commodity exchange 
corresponds to the Doctrine of Being, the doubling of commodity and 
money corresponds to the Doctrine of Essence and capital corresponds 
to the Doctrine of the Concept.68 Unfortunately, Arthur does not give 
reasons for this particular correspondence, and it is also not strictly 
followed in the analysis of the second part of ‘Marx’s Capital and 
Hegel’s Logic’69 (Chapter 5 of The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital). But 
this, I contend, is where one of the problems of Arthur’s attempt lies: 
a random selection of categories of Hegel’s Logic is selectively and 
arbitrarily applied to a selection of more or less random categories 
of the first five chapters in Capital. However, there are two instances 
in which Arthur draws on the dialectical-categorial development of 
the beginning of Hegel’s Logic with Being and Nothingness. One is 
to be found in the latter part of ‘Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic’, one 
discussed as the dialectic of absence and presence of value in Chapter 
8, ‘The Spectre of Capital’. Though, initially, I have planned (and written) 
a discussion of both chapters, for reasons of space I will restrict my 
discussion to Arthur’s presentation in the chapter on ‘’Marx’s Capital 
and Hegel’s Logic’. The reason is simple: The ‘dialectic’ of presence 
and absence adds no cognitive gain (Erkenntnisgewinn) to Arthur’s 
‘homologisation’ between Hegel and Marx which is clearly enough 
illustrated in ‘Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic.’
In Arthur’s reconstruction of the allegedly homologous categories 
of Marx’s value form theory and  the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, Being 
66  Ibid.
67  See also Arthur’s in my view justified critique of Ernest Mandel in ‘Marx, 
Orthodoxy, Labour, Value’, in Arthur 2000, pp. 5-11.
68  See Arthur 2004, p. 79.
69  By the ‘second or latter part of this chapter’ I mean the text following the 
subheader ‘The Presentation of the Value Form’, in Arthur 2004, pp. 89 ff.
and Nothingness – in spite of being the first categories of the Doctrine 
of Being in which ‘Quality’ is thematic – get almost no place, never 
mind being categories whose motif is excessively justified in the Logic’s 
introduction. Arthur laconically applies being and ‘nothing’ in an 
unrelated and arbitrary manner to ‘commodity exchange’ in which their 
logical status is rendered completely unclear:
 ‘Given exchange, we can speak of commodities in terms of the 
elementary opposition between Being and Nothing treated by Hegel 
at the beginning of his Logic. They have their being in the circuits 
of exchange; but as yet they reveal nothing about themselves that 
guarantees this status; indeed they regularly disappear from the 
space of exchange relations, perhaps to be consumed. Their being 
become determinate, and fixed in this sphere, is that of exchangeable 
commodities. Commodities are distinguished from being goods in 
general by the quality of being exchangeable.’70
In what way can we say that Hegel’s categories form the 
background for this assumption? Perhaps more importantly, in what way 
does Arthur’s presentation obey the self-imposed task of conceptual 
purity he finds in Hegel? First of all, Hegel’s categories at the beginning 
do not signify ‘things’ such as would be the commodity. It is not until the 
Doctrine of Essence far later in the presentation that Hegel thematises 
‘existence’ and ‘things’ at all.71 Really existing, spatially extended 
and identifiable objects in time strictly speaking do not form a part 
of the Logic at all, but belong to the Philosophy of Nature in Hegel’s 
overarching system.72 Yet, Arthur presupposes the existence of ‘things’ 
as this earliest presentation, undermining his own claim of conceptual 
purity and conflating different levels of presentation. But if even if we 
grant that the ‘being’ of commodities is the very being that is thematic 
at the beginning of the Logic – where do the commodities belong? 
In other words, what concept in the Logic corresponds to that of the 
70  Arthur 2004, p. 90. Bold print in the original to highlight Hegel’s terminology. 
Arthur applies the same procedure to  Marx’s concept of ‘Money’ in correspondence to concepts 
of Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence and Marx’s concept of ‘Capital’ in correspondence to concepts of 
Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept. See Arthur 2004, p. 95 and Arthur 2004, p. 101. For reasons of space, 
the latter two ‘homologies’ cannot be discussed. We shall  already see from the discussion of Arthur’s 
declared homology between ‘Commodity Exchange’ with the Doctrine of Being how the single 
conceptual ‘homologies’ are flawed by virtue of being positioned at different levels of abstraction in 
Hegel’s Logic alone.
71  See The Doctrine of Essence, where in the second Section on ‘Appearance’ 
and the chapter on ‘Existence’, ‘The Thing and its Properties’ (Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften) 
becomes thematic for the first time. Hegel 1986c, p. 129.
72  See Hegel 1986d in the Section on ‘Physics’, §§ 272-336.
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commodity?73  To be sure, in the preceding section, Arthur introduces a 
specific interpretative schema by which to determine the commodity as 
the starting point, the triad of ‘sociation, dissociation, and association’ 
that we also find in Geert Reuten and Michael Williams74. With the 
help of this heuristic, Arthur identifies the ‘sociation-dissociation 
contradiction’ as ‘the presupposition of the entire epoch, and hence our 
presentation.’75 
  ‘...it is association through exchange that gives this 
contradiction ‘room to move’; the first concrete category is therefore this 
mediation, and we study its further development; this first category of 
movement determines goods as commodities, and hence the first object 
of analysis is the commodity; a unity of use value and exchange value; 
this doubling is a relation in which the form, the abstract universal, 
dominates the matter, the particular use values; the value form is 
therefore the theme of our categorial dialectic.’76
How is Hegel’s, or for that matter, Marx’s method, reflected 
or applied in this assumption? Note here that the problem under 
discussion is Arthur’s particular application of the alleged homology 
between Hegel’s categories to that of Marx, not a general rejection 
of such an attempt.77 It is however unclear how in Arthur’s view 
either the category of ‘movement’ or the category of ‘association 
through exchange’ that supposedly necessitates the category of the 
commodity finds its correlate in Hegel’s Logic of Being. Let me first 
look at the category of ‘movement’: how do we derive the commodity 
from it? First, Arthur seems to confuse the quality of an object (that 
it moves, circulates) with being a cause of it. Saying that ‘this first 
category of movement determines goods as commodities’ takes one of 
the commodities’ qualities as its own principal cause - while it would 
be no less reasonable to assume either ‘time’ or ‘space’ rather than 
73  In the appendix to this chapter, Arthur provides a table with the corresponding 
concepts in both Hegel’s system and Marx’s presentation of the first five chapters of Capital as 
an overview of the preceding argument. But just how the correspondence between The Doctrine 
of Being and the Commodity is justified, remains completely obscure. The same goes for the other 
conceptual correspondences (e.g. The Doctrine of Essence corresponds to Money, with the structural 
moment of ‘reflection and mediation: the being-for-itself and show of the Concept’ functioning as an 
interpretative schema without showing how this claim concretely applies). See Arthur 2004, p. 108-9.
74  See Reuten/Williams 1989.
75  Arthur 2004, p. 88.
76  Arthur 2004, p. 89. Emphasis i.t.o.
77  For an intensive discussion of the commodity as the starting point in relation to 
its  ‘subterranean’ critique of Hegel that also functions as its methodological presupposition, let me 
only refer to Pepperell 2010, p. 142 ff. The view that Capital starts with the Commodity is however not 
uncontested. See Holloway 2015.
‘movement’ as ‘causing’ factors of the commodity. The relation between 
‘movement’ and ‘the commodity’ cannot be presented in a way that 
discloses the categories’ strictly necessary nexus, so that the homology 
Arthur draws is questionable. Second, while it is true that, in the 
commodity form, the form dominates the matter – this observation can 
be made without referring to the category of movement at all. Besides, 
while ‘form’ and ‘content’ belong to the Logic, ‘movement’ is not a 
logical motive, but, again, belongs to the Philosophy of Nature.78 All in 
all, the categories Arthur picks from Hegel’s Logic in order to ‘identify’ 
them with those of Marx’s exposition belong to entirely different levels of 
abstraction in Hegel’s system. 
The category of ‘association through exchange’ is even more 
questionable as having a categorial correspondence in Being or 
Nothingness. Its logical status  is completely obscure as measured 
against the Logic. 
But let us come back to the conceptual derivation by which Arthur 
identifies Being and Nothingness in Marx’s presentation. How should 
we interpret the context in which Arthur extracts the important category 
of Nothingness to apply it to the exchange of commodities? ‘[The 
commodities] reveal nothing about themselves that guarantees this 
status [of being]; indeed they regularly disappear from the space of 
exchange relations, perhaps to be consumed’. Arthur’s analysis of being 
and nothingness stops here. With this predication, we are unable to 
discern any meaningful conceptual nexus or correspondence between 
the notion of Nothingness in the context of the Logic’s beginning and 
Arthur’s own interpretation in the self-proclaimed context of Marx’s 
value form analysis. However, there is a deeper structural reason 
for Arthur’s lopsided derivation of nothingness from the context of 
Hegel’s Logic: Arthur not only underestimates the significance of the 
category of ‘nothingness’ which introduces the motif of negation to 
Hegel’s Logic, but provides no explanation of its strategic role within the 
dialectical movement, as e.g. theories of the antinomical structure of the 
category of Nothingness do. What Arthur does not take notice of is the 
complexity and significance of the first determinations that give rise to 
the dialectical categorial development in the first place, and with it, the 
dialectic at work in the structure of Hegel’s Logic. This is all stranger as 
Arthur proclaims to have established a ‘New Dialectic’ that is directly 
informed by Hegel’s form determinations – without having a thorough 
understanding of Hegel’s method itself.  
To come back to the text, in what way does Arthur then justify 
that ‘nothing’ is revealed and that, ‘they regularly disappear from the 
78  In the section on ‘Mechanics’ in the First Department of the Philosophy of Nature 
of the Encyclopedia. Hegel 1986d, esp. §§ 262-3.
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space (sic) of exchange relations, perhaps to be consumed.’ It remains 
unclear which logical status the categories of ‘revelation’, ‘space’ 
and ‘consumption’ (and the notion ‘perhaps’, for that matter!) have in 
Marx’s context – viewed through the lens of the Logic’s beginning – and 
what their inner connection is. Again, the categories of ‘space’ and 
‘consumption’ precisely do not belong to the Logic at all, least of all in 
their conceptual relation, and have no discernible correspondence in 
Marx’s conceptual scheme.79 On the other hand, Arthur freely omits the 
important category of Becoming in this presentation as the precondition 
for the categories’ concretisation into Dasein and Negation, and instead 
integrates the category of ‘quality’ which is not part of the categorial 
deduction at all, but the chapter’s encompassing theme!80 Arthur’s 
choice as to which concepts of Hegel’s Logic are reflected in Marx’s value 
form analysis and which are not, seems to follow no discernible line of 
deduction and renders their selection thoroughly arbitrary.81 
For now however, let us make an excursus on the important 
concept of Nothingness for a while and shortly elucidate the important 
heuristic of antinomical structure. The category of Negation in 
Hegel’s Logic, the more complex and advanced form of Nothingness 
and the motor of dialectical thought, has its systematic place in the 
chapter on ‘Dasein’ as the more concrete form of Being. It shows in 
itself its own necessity of and for thought (zeigt an sich selbst seine 
eigene Denknotwendigkeit), because, as ‘pure’ Nothingness, it would be 
unthinkable, as I will soon show. The same applies to Being and its ‘self-
sameness’ with Nothingness. In other words, in the indeterminacy and 
abstraction of the ‘unthinkable’ and as yet uncomprehended categories 
of Being and Nothingness where an as of yet incomplete determination 
of nothingness is first introduced, immediacy becomes thematic as its own 
impossibility, as shown above. One may argue that, in this case, Hegel 
should have started with the category of ‘immediacy’ (or ‘indeterminacy’, 
or the ‘indeterminable’) without further ado –  but even in this case, 
79  The objection that commodities are produced for consumption completely misses 
the mark of Marx’s value form analysis: ‘The use-values of commodities provide the material for a 
special branch of knowledge, namely the commercial knowledge of commodities.’ Marx 1976a, p. 126.  
See also  ‘… the exchange relation of commodities is characterized precisely by its abstraction from 
their use value.’ Marx 1976a, p. 127. 
80  It is the title of the First Section in the Logic: „Determinacy (Quality)“. See Hegel 
1986b, p. 82.
81  The usefulness of Being, Nothingness, and Becoming as a conceptual template 
to analyse social process are dubious precisely because they do not refer to ‘real processes’ – i.e. 
processes taking place outside of thought -  at all. Arthur is aware of that. As one reviewer of 
the present essay however suggested, the dialectic of Being and Nothingness was pertinent in 
commodity exchange, because there were jobs which involve producing ‘nothingness’ – we pay 
people to take out our trash, for example. But this idea invites a category mistake. Arthur, on the 
other hand, is very clear on separating Hegel’s presentation from a direct application for describing 
‘really existing capitalism’. He correctly locates Hegel’s and Marx’s presentation at high levels of 
conceptual abstraction, even if I do not agree with the specific way he identifies both. 
further abstraction would have shown that ‘immediacy’ already contains 
a negation: namely, that of mediation (or ‘mediacy’, Vermittlung).  In 
other words, positing ‘immediacy’ (Unmittelbarkeit) as first category, 
will show itself to be the other of – the negation of – mediacy. As such, 
it contains a category of reflection, the difference to mediacy that only 
becomes thematic in the Doctrine of Essence – but we are still in the 
realm of Being. Consequently, we find that the category of immediacy 
is therefore derived, contrary to its alleged ‘purity’. We come to find 
Being and Nothingness as the first categories, however incomplete, 
‘furthest from the truth’ - and as such, mediated. I have shown above 
how Hegel perceives of the beginning not as pure, but as the ‘result’ of a 
circular process in which ‘pure knowledge’ (a contradiction in terms) is 
‘released’ (entlassen) to its sheer form in immediacy.
The point I want to make here in almost inexcusable brevity, 
drawing on the works of Kesselring (1981) and Wandschneider 
(1995) is that the dialectical exposition of Being and Nothing has to 
be understood as an antinomical structure, containing an antinomical 
contradiction. This antinomical structure succumbs the categorial 
movement of dialectical thought at its most general, so that giving an 
account on the function of the antinomical structure will simultaneously 
give an outline to a theory of dialectic and highlight the essential role of 
negation within it. In the following, what is at stake is Arthur’s claim 
that the presentation of the value form in Capital vol. 1 and Hegel’s 
logic ‘are to be identified; we are not simply applying Hegel’s logic to an 
independent content’82 and that the ‘forms’ of value ‘are in effect of such 
abstract purity as to constitute a real incarnation of the ideas of Hegel’s 
logic.’ Arthur’s reading as explicated above shall be contrasted with 
two approaches that deal with the dialectic of Being and Nothingness in 
the beginning of the Logic and deliver a core understanding for Hegel’s 
dialectic, in order to question the validity of Arthur’s claim. In that 
sense, the following is not at all an exhaustive presentation of Hegel’s 
dialectic, but rather designates a minimum standard by which we can 
begin to decipher its complexity.
4. The Antinomical Structure of Being and Nothingness
Like the author of the present essay, Kesselring’s pioneering work 
on the role of the antinomical structure assumes that the categories of 
Being and Nothingness as a ‘germ-like … concrete totality’ (‘keimhaft 
angelegte konkrete Totalität’) can only be legitimised ‘in hindsight’ (‘im 
Rückblick’).83   The search for an ‘absolute’ beginning  - a regress that 
82  Arthur 2004, p. 82.
83  Kesselring 1981, p. 566. Arthur interestingly also uses the concept of the ‘germ’ 
of value in its ‘immediacy’, but provides no method with which to show its ‘unfolding’, whether in 
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is simultaneously a progress – would show that thought itself is the 
ultimate abstraction. The problem however is that thought itself cannot 
be abstracted from. What can be abstracted from, however, is the content 
of thought. It is Being in its ‘pure’ form that abstracts from all content 
of thought, so that Being ‘is’ the most abstract, most indeterminate 
concept. However, every logical predication to be made about Being 
must necessarily ‘falsify’ or ‘distort’ its own character, so that we must 
look for a further method to determine the indeterminate: 
  ‘Consciousness resp. Thought, because it abstracts 
from all abstraction, now only confronts Being, which is in a 
constitution (Verfassung) that is falsified by any sound sentence aimed 
at characterising it. Because who talks or thinks about Being has in truth 
not abstracted from her own thought. Accordingly, if Hegel describes 
the development from Being to Nothingness and Becoming towards 
Dasein (Determinate Being), he moves within outer reflection (on the 
standpoint of ‘pure Being’, language and discursive thought would be 
impossible).’84 
The presentation of the categorial development would only be 
possible on the basis of abstraction from thought (inner reflection), and, 
since that would require a cognitive performance, it is factually (self-)
contradictory, and hence, impossible. Kesselring however argues that 
this ‘impossibility’ is of constitutive significance for the understanding 
of the Logic’ method, because it is translatable into the legitimate relation 
of an antinomical structure, by which the development of categories is 
initiated in the first place. To recapitulate: the thought-determinations 
(Denkbestimmungen) of ‘immediate’ Being and Nothingness, being 
pure quality, evade any determinable content. This is why Being and 
Nothingness, in their indeterminable sameness (differentiating Being 
from Nothingness would already imply the thought-reflexion ‘is not’, 
which would render ‘immediate’ Being determinate, and therefore ‘not-
immediate’) cannot be provided with a predication. Consequently, Hegel 
does not say what Being and Nothingness are, but uses an anakoluth to 
signify their sheer unthinkability: ‘Being, pure Being – without any further 
determination.’85 and ‘Nothingness, pure Nothingness; it is simple self-
sameness, perfect emptiness, indeterminacy and contentlessness 
(Inhaltslosigkeit); undifferentiatedness in itself (Ununterschiedenheit in 
ihm selbst).’86. 
hindsight or from the outset.
84  Kesselring 1981, p. 571.
85  Hegel 1986b, p. 82.
86  Hegel 1986b, p. 83.
The prequisition for the antinomical structure initiating the 
dialectical development is the fact that Being is ‘determined as 
indeterminate’ (als unbestimmt bestimmt). This leads to antinomy (A):  
(A) either Being is indeterminate, but then it is wrong that it is 
determinate (even ‘as indeterminate’) 
or Being is determinate, but then it is wrong to determine it as 
indeterminate.87
Antinomy (A) can only be solved if its cause is eliminated, that 
is, if it is abstracted from the subjective cognitive performance that 
led to it. ‘However, this abstraction requires to indeterminately negate 
the term ‘determined’ in the expression ‘determined as indeterminate’ 
(this expression is the result of a cognitive performance). Being will 
then however be im-predicable … every subjective performance on 
Being would then be negated – but this negation itself would still be a 
subjective performance.’88 This problem leads to antinomy (B):
(B) either one tries to account for what Being is - but that leads to 
negating the attempt, i.e. to leave it be
or one consciously relinquishes this attempt; with the method of 
not thinking Being, one however applies the correct procedure to think 
Being.
We can see here how the category of Negation functions as the 
motor of the further development, but also of ‘determining’ Being in 
Nothingness in hindsight: we have already performed the cognitive 
act of negating both in order to be able to think them. ‘The cause of the 
antinomy’, Kesselring argues, ‘lies in the abstraction of thought from 
itself. This abstraction has the consequence that Being itself vanishes, 
so that it passes over to nothing (‘Nothingness’) … but since every 
abstraction is a cognitive act (Denkleistung), in (B) we do not only deal 
with nothing at all, but with this particular cognitive act (of negation).’ 
89 Regarding that whatever we have hitherto tried to characterise as 
Being leads to Nothingness, its ‘opposite’, as its consequential form 
determination also indicates Being and nothingness as ‘the same’, 
in their ‘self-sameness’. Yet, they are also different, as the cognitive 
performance of negation makes clear from hindsight: without a separate 
semantic function of Nothingness from Being, we would not come to 
Dasein, nor to the category of Negation. Here, precisely, is the kernel of 
87  Kesselring 1981, p. 572.
88  Kesselring 1981, p. 572.
89  Kesselring 1981, p. 572. 
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
262 263
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
the antinomical structure inherent in the first determinations. 
Wandschneider’s assessment of the antinomical structure 
to be identified as the basic dialectical function in Hegel’s method 
can be regarded as a ‘fine-tuning’ of Kesselring’s pioneering 
work. Wandschneider assumes the principle of complementarity 
(Komplementaritätsprinzip). In it, Being, by virtue of its logical-
semantical constitution, must be ‘semantically equivalent’ with ‘not-
Nothingness’ (‘nicht-Nichtsein’). Schematically, this is expressed in
(1) <B> = <not-N>.90 
The opposition expressed in this equation is ‘constitutive for the 
meaning of Being.’91 The opposition could however also be expressed in 
terms of equivalence, then follows: <B> is not equivalent with <N>. The 
italicised ‘is not’ however shows that the concept <B> in its meaning 
of Being itself presents a case of non-being. It therefore has the quality 
which is equivalent  to the meaning of the concept of <N> which we 
have previously identified it as its opposite in (1). Because Being thus 
becomes ‘an instance of <N>’, we can say:
(2)   <B> is <N>-equivalent.92
In this schema, for <B> however still, the meaning of Being must 
be conceded, expressed in the copula. The concept <B> therefore has 
the quality that corresponds to its meaning: Being. In this case, <B> is 
<B>-equivalent. But according to (1), <B> is not equivalent to <N>, so 
that
(3) <B> is not <N>-equivalent.93
By following (3) from (2), we set an automatism in motion, since 
on the side of <B> we again arrive at a case of non-being (‘is not’).94  
90  Wandschneider 1995, p. 104, where <B> stands for Being, <N> for Nothingness 
and the brackets ‘<...>’ stand for the intensional (not intentional) semantic content expressed in the 
concept, not for an entity or ‘instance’ that is its equivalent (e.g. the realm of things that exist). 
91  Wandschneider 1995, p. 55.
92  ‘<S> ist <N>-entsprechend.’ Wandschneider 1995, p. 56. 
93  ‘<S> ist nicht <N>-entsprechend.’ Ibid.
94  Hegel argues this point in the 1812 original edition more clearly than in the 1831 
edition. In Remark 2 to the First Chapter, suceeding the category of Becoming, he again emphasises 
the necessarily nexus between Being and Nothingness by showing that Being ‘is’ Nothingness’ 
and that ‘this must be shown in its immediacy’. His first example is ‘Being is the Absolute.’ 
Here, according to Hegel, Being is predicated of something that it is not, ‘that is differentiated 
from it.’ Hegel 1966, p. 35. ‘What is differentiated from it is something other than it; the other 
A new predication must accordingly be attributed to <B> which 
would contradict the previous schema. Alternatingly contradictory 
predicates which result from their application to a concept by 
reflecting on the concept’s semantic content, Wandschneider calls 
‘antinomical structures’ which must be based on an antinomical concept. 
The antinomical concept brings forth an antinomical structure by 
being ‘the negative determination of equivalence with regard to 
itself’ (negative Entsprechungsbestimmung seiner selbst).95 From this 
negative determination of equivalence with regard to itself – or this 
negative self-referentiality – follows that every application of a structure 
of predication on this antinomical concept results in permanently 
alternating determinations of equivalence. The sequence of alternatingly 
contradictory determinations of equivalence is the main characteristic 
of the antinomical concept which Wandschneider find in Hegel’s 
determinations of the beginning. Concretely, the antinomical concept on 
which the first movement is based is to be found in the schema 
(4) <N> = <not-<N>-equivalent>.
It is, however, important for Wandschneider that the passing from 
the level of qualities (‘<N>-equivalent’, ‘not <N>-equivalent’) to the level 
of meaning is considered in (4). By inferring that a relation of equivalence 
(Entsprechungsverhältnis) determines the quality of an entity (in the sense 
that ‘<red>-equivalent’ determines the quality ‘red’), we can now say 
that the concept <not-<N>-equivalent> is equivalent to the concept of 
<not-N>. From this and (1) follows
(5) <B> = <N>.
This result is obviously contradictory to (1), even if (1) is 
indispensable for the semantic content of <B> and cannot be discarded. 
For the meaning of Being, needless to say, the demarcation against its 
negation, Nothingness or Non-Being96, is constitutive. Wandschneider 
follows that both predications, (1) and (5), must be valid, even if they 
are mutually exclusive. The point Wandschneider emphasises is that 
they are not formally contradictory, because both predications adhere 
however contains the Nothing of that by which it is its Other. What is therefore contained in this 
sentence is not pure Being, but simultaneously Being in relation to its Nothing. - The Absolute is 
hence differentiated from it; but by saying it is the Absolute, it is likewise said that they are not 
differentiated.’ Hegel 1966, p. 36. In other words, what is expressed in a sentence of identity  - the non-
being of difference - simultaneously expresses precisely this very difference.    
95  Wandschneider 1995, p. 37.
96  Nothingness and Non-Being are synonymous also in Hegel: ‘If it is deemed more 
correct to oppose non-being to being, instead of nothing, there is no objection to this as regards the 
result, since in non-being there is contained the reference to being.’ Hegel 2010, p. 60.   
The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’ The Critique of Political Economy and the ‘New Dialectic’
264 265
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
to different levels of reflection. This has nothing to do with not admitting 
the Law of the Excluded Middle: in tertium non datur, the contradiction 
precisely consists in relating to the same aspect at the same time for 
both sides of the contradiction. To say ‘John is alive and John is not 
alive’ is only a contradiction if we are talking about the same identical 
John at the same time.   
Wandschneider therefore suggests to introduce the concept 
of the ‘opposite equivalence of meaning’ (entgegengesetzte 
Bedeutungsäquivalenz) to elucidate the nexus between the mutually 
exclusive and mutually presupposing elements that adhere to different 
levels of reflection:
(6)  (<B> = <not-<N>)  ⊕  (<B> = <N>)
The symbol ‘⊕’ does not denote ‘exclusive disjunction’ in this case, 
but that both sides of the predication belong together to from a whole 
that is not a formal, but a dialectical contradiction: it was generated 
from the movement of thought itself, while simultaneously addressing 
two different levels of abstraction. Each side, taken in isolation, would 
evoke a formal contradiction, but not when viewed how one side 
presupposes the other. Herein consists the novelty of Wandschneider’s 
formalisation: clarifying the character of the dialectical contradiction 
that sets Hegel’s categorial development in motion. It disperses the 
mystery surrounding ‘Hegel’s dialectic’ by providing a clear conceptual-
logical understanding, eliminating the vagueness of notions that Hegel’s 
method represented a movement ‘from the simple to the complex’.
Needless to say, the above discussion delivers only a small detail 
of the overall argument Wandschneider delivers in his interpretation 
of Hegel’s dialectical method, which for reason of space can only be 
presented in harsh limitation. Wandschneider for example elaborates 
on the aspect of the difference between the pragmatic-dialectical 
and the semantic-dialectical contradiction that has been mentioned 
before in connection with the ‘pragmatic surplus of meaning’ – this 
discussion however must remain excluded from the presentation here. 
For our purposes, it is solely useful to give a glimpse of the complexity 
that involves not only conceptual abstraction, but multi-faceted levels 
of thought determining itself by which Hegel introduces the beginning’s 
dialectic. With this argumentative background in mind, we come to the 
conclusion that Arthur’s claim that the ‘forms’ of value ‘are in effect of 
such abstract purity as to constitute a real incarnation of the ideas of 
Hegel’s logic’ is difficult to defend, especially when the ‘ideas of Hegel’s 
logic’ – or rather, the idea of Hegel’s logic and the theory of dialectic that 
accompanies its unfolding - is only insufficiently grasped.
To sum up, the study on ‘Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic’ remains 
heavily selective as to which concepts of the Logic are applied to 
which theorems as presented in the chapters of Marx’s main work: 
the categories of the Logic’s greater division into Being, Essence and 
Concept (in which Arthur omits Becoming, Finity/Infinity, Being-for-
Itself, The One and the Many, Repulsion and Attraction in the Chapter 
on Quality alone), are applied to Commodity Exchange, Money and 
Capital (Ch. 1 and 4, omitting Ch. 2 and 3 and parts of Ch. 1, such as, 
tellingly, Section 4 on the ‘Fetishism of Commodities and its Secret’). 
It would be unproblematic to admit that not each and every single 
category of the Logic will show to be correspondent with those of Marx’s 
work: but there would have to be 1) a defense of the decision to present 
particular categories while omitting others (which would in turn require 
a clear methodological reflection on one’s own presentation), and 2) a 
clear concession or disclaimer that the exposition cannot be 100% strict. 
Instead, Arthur argues that Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic ‘are to be 
identified’. 
But also in Arthur’s own terms, the methodological decision as 
to which category should be elected to present the beginning of Marx’s 
analysis, is unclear. We find varying concepts and varying justifications 
of these concepts to designate the first category of Capital. Arthur gives 
reasons for the ‘commodity’ as a starting point – ‘To begin with we shall 
analyse the commodity-form itself’97 – but he seems to be unable to 
decide whether it should not rather be, simply, the ‘value form’ which 
‘should be analysed first’98 or the exchange of commodities: ‘In other 
words … the presentation starts with the mode of exchange.’99 
Let us finally turn to the third and last problem with Arthur’s 
research programme and the way it is conducted emerges: the question 
of a possible analogy to Marx’s Capital as a Critique of Political Economy 
in Hegel. 
5. What’s left of Marx’s critical impetus if we say that 
value form analysis and Hegel’s Logic are to be ‘identified’?
In the discussion of ‘Hegel’s Theory of the Value form’ (Chapter 9), 
Arthur convincingly demonstrates Hegel’s trajectory from an objective 
value theory in the Jena system towards an ‘idealist shift’100 in his 
Philosophy of Right where value is solely determined by the will and needs 
of independent owners of use values who are ‘informed by rational 
97  Arthur 2004, p. 85.
98  Arthur 2004, p. 86.
99  Arthur 2004, p. 86.
100  Arthur 2004, p. 191.
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considerations’101. In its mediation on a universal social scale in money, 
Arthur links his insight to the problem of value as socially necessary 
labour time which gets obfuscated by exchange conducted in such 
manner, and says that ‘[i]t is at the global level, where exchange is a 
systematic and regular social mediation, that socially necessary labour 
times (sic) impose themselves on exchange.’102 More specifically, Arthur 
sees Hegel’s theory of value as not guilty of the kind of commodity 
fetishism Marx criticised in the first chapter of Capital, namely that of 
seeing value as an inherent quality of the commodity. He rather sees 
Hegel guilty of ‘fetishising the commodity form’:
 
 ‘Hegel insists, no less strongly than Marx, that value is a form 
imposed on goods in the relations established by social activity. But 
for Marx this form is the object of criticism: commodity fetishism is a 
sign that the ‘’process of production has mastery over man, instead of 
the opposite.’’ Yet Hegel interprets the same situation as one in which 
by imposing this social form on things ‘’man exhibits his mastery over 
them’’. In accordance with this principle Hegel advances the claim 
that it ‘’is the thing’s value wherein its genuine substantiality becomes 
determinate and an object of consciousness.’’ In asserting that the thing 
has ‘’genuine substantiality’’ for us only in value Hegel has thus ended 
by fetishising the commodity form.’103
But it is a contradiction to say, on the one hand, that Hegel is not 
guilty of the reading Arthur offers of Marx’s criticism of commodity 
fetishism in Sec. 4, Ch. 1 – namely of ‘substantialising’ a value content to 
the commodity – and to claim in the next sentence that this is precisely 
what Hegel does – namely to assert that ‘the thing has ‘’genuine 
substantiality’’ for us only in value’ and say that this view is merely a 
victim of the commodity form.
This odd style of argument aside: what do we gain from Arthur’s 
– in my view, correct – insight that Hegel’s assessment of the value 
form fundamentally lacks the critical impetus of Marx’s analysis that 
culminates in his conception of the fetish: can we still ‘identify’ both? 
Does Hegel not rather – as Arthur indicates – become himself a victim of 
the fetish that Marx’s describes, and for which ‘Man’s’ alleged ‘mastery’ 
over the production process is paradigmatic? To postpone the first 
question for a moment and preliminarily answer the second with a ‘yes’, 
let us turn to a more general overview of Hegel’s project, contrasting 
Marx. For Hegel, the concept reveals itself. At first, at the level of 
101  Arthur 2004, p. 189.
102  Arthur 2004, p. 190.
103  Arthur 2004, p. 191.
appearance, it is superficially true, while with the further distinctions 
it becomes false, before it becomes finally true ‘again’, but now as the 
concrete totality of all the previous determinations which are sublated, in 
the triple meaning of the word.104 For Marx, in stark contrast to Hegel, the 
concept however does not reveal itself. Understanding the operations 
of the capitalist system is not a question of the self-presentation of the 
concept at all. Quite to the contrary: what the concept and the concepts 
present (darstellen), has to be read against themselves, as the abyss 
between their appearance and their uncomprehended presuppositions, 
or their essence. For Marx, the truth of what is will not come to appear. 
This is his primary objection against Hegel’s idealism in which, if only 
we carefully recapitulate the concept’s dialectical journey, we will be 
rewarded with the appearance of Truth. But for Marx, the economic 
concepts exist because of their necessary falseness. To state this 
more precisely – while making things more complicated –, everything 
that exists in the conceptual form of social and economic convention, 
exists in a state of their mere appearance. The essence of these 
concepts is hidden, often in the ‘abode of production’. The (commodity) 
fetishism that is the central theme of Marx’s Critique of Political 
Economy expresses the criticism of the inverted truth in the categories’ 
appearance. Take the ‘value of labour’ as an example in which 
‘the concept of value is not only completely extinguished, 
but inverted, so that it becomes its contrary. It is an expression as 
imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary expressions 
arise, nevertheless, from the relations of production themselves. They 
are categories for the forms of appearance of essential relations. 
That in their appearance things are often presented in an inverted 
way is something fairly familiar in every science, apart from political 
economy.’105
By virtue of his system, Hegel positioned himself against the idea 
that the real and the ideal did and could not match – with the important 
condition that understanding/the intellect gave way to dialectically 
grasping the initial concepts’ falseness to open up to their truth in 
which, finally, the world and the concept we have of it would coincide. 
That would be the world of reason. To sum up, for Hegel, our task was 
to comprehend the logical, the natural, the scientific, the historical, 
the economic, the social and the psychological categories in their 
final truth, not – like Marx –  in their final falseness. For Hegel therefore, 
104  The triple meaning is less clear in English than in the German, where ‘aufheben’ 
denotes 1. to lift something up, 2. to keep something (in the sense of ‘aufbewahren’), 3. to abolish 
something. All three meanings are incorporated in the categorial development. 
105  Marx 1976a, p. 677.
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Kantian understanding could only give us a distorted and incomplete 
picture of the rightness of everything that exists. Hegel saw his 
‘breakthrough to dialectic’ as the encompassing moment of such limited 
understanding of the world which would, finally, reveal the coincidence 
of Being and Thought. As a scientific approach, nothing could be 
further from Marx’s critical project. Indeed, Hegel’s affirmative world 
view that does not contradict pursuing a critical viewpoint of particular 
philosophical schools and their ‘reified world of metaphysic’106 (Hume, 
Berkeley, German ‘critical philosophy’, Fichtean ‘intellectual intuition’) 
– especially towards the later years and the Encyclopedia – could not 
incorporate a concept as (commodity) fetishism, even if it wanted to. To 
simply identify Marx’s theory with Hegel’s Logic suggests to abandon 
Marx’s project of a ‘ruthless criticism of all that exists.’107 
This is not to deny that Hegel’s system lacks a critical function 
in toto. Quite to the contrary, as Michael Theunissen’s influential and 
seminal study on Being and Seeming – The Critical Function of Hegel’s 
Logic (Sein und Schein - Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik) has 
shown, Hegel’s method shares an important cognitive interest with 
Marx’s project, namely the unity of presentation and criticism (die Einheit von 
Darstellung und Kritik) which is particularly clear in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, but also in the Logic. Quoting from the Phenomenology: ‘The easiest 
task is to judge what has content (Gehalt) and solidity (Gediegenheit), 
more difficult is its comprehension, and the most difficult, that what 
unites both, is to generate its presentation’108, according to Theunissen, 
the Phenomenology poses the methodological standard that 
 ‘in the presentation, comprehension (das Erfassen) connects itself 
with judgment (Beurteilung), which is at all times criticism. Now Hegel 
also puts the Science of Logic to the same demands … Simultaneously, 
he commits [the Logic] to the task of criticism which must be at one 
with that of presentation. Moreover, he is convinced that the unity of 
presentation and criticism which philosophy generally has to endeavour, 
will characterise logic not only as one, namely as the fundamental 
philosophical science, but as a logic, i.e. in its methodologically specific 
aspect.109     
But Hegel’s critical enterprise is not only a matter of form or 
method. As Theunissen shows in great detail (which to reproduce here 
is impossible), the object of Hegel’s criticism, especially in the Logic 
106  Theunissen 1980, p. 71.
107  Marx in his letter to Arnold Ruge, September 1843. Marx 1976b,  p. 344.
108  Hegel 1986a, p. 11 
109  Theunissen, p. 14.
of Being is ‘reifying thought’ (vergegenständlichendes Denken), more 
precisely an ontology which claims the existence of Being-in-itself: 
‘The criticism of reifying thought is the specific calling of this part of 
the Logic.’110 What follows, more importantly, is Hegel’s construction of 
his Logic as a critique of ‘indifference’ (Gleichgültigkeit) and ‘domination’ 
(Herrschaft) as the overall theme and objects of criticism which, for 
Theunissen, in a certain extent also applies to Marx. As for Hegel, this 
is precisely because the being-logical (seinslogische) expression for 
the constitution of reified being (Dasein) is ‘indifference towards the 
other’.111 The indifference is the sign of the first concepts’ own falsity, for 
as isolated categories, in separation from their reflexivity, their precise 
‘in-difference’ (or ‘immediacy’ as we have seen in the self-sameness of 
Being and Nothingness), they must perish. As a critic of indifference 
however, Hegel also becomes a critic of domination. According to 
Theunissen, the Logic of Essence plays a significant role here: it 
reveals what reifying thought actually does. In its course, reification 
(Vergegenständlichung) becomes autonomisation (Verselbständigung)112 
which is produced by categories that fix all that exists only in relation 
to themselves. The autonomy (Selbständigkeit) of the categories in the 
Logic of Essence is what differentiates it from the Logic of Being, but 
even these categories (i.e. the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’) are as such only in 
their unity, together: ‘Obviously’, Theunissen argues, ‘this being-with-
one another or togetherness is the opposite of indifference against the 
other.’113 In this state of opposition however, they are not indifferent, 
but relate to one another in a specific form that invites domination of 
one over the other: the autonomous being of the One (das Eine) which 
stands in opposition to the Other (das Andere) accordingly becomes 
the Whole (das Ganze) which encompasses the Other as its own 
moment: hence domination. From here, Theunissen follows that ‘[t]he 
identity of the oppositional concepts of autonomy however expresses 
more than just the ‘togetherness’ of indifference and domination. 
Domination not only presupposes indifferent existence (gleichgültiges 
Bestehen), but exponantiates it.’114 Since the relation of determinations 
of reflection to themselves is defined by having ‘the relation of its being 
different (Anderssein) in itself’, which is precisely the expression of its 
indifference in its relation to itself (isolation), it constantly re-inforces 
its own domination over the Other. Hence, domination and indifference 
110  Theunissen 1981, p. 25.
111  Theunissen 1981, p. 25. To be differentiated from the essence-logical 
(wesenslogisch) determination of ‘indifference towards itself’. 
112  Theunissen 1981, p. 28.
113  Theunissen 1981, p. 28.
114  Theunissen 1981, p. 30.
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are intricately entwined, and with good reasons one may assume that 
they form an overarching topos of Hegel’s critique.115       
Note that here Hegel only argues strictly within the realm of the 
Logic. But Theunissen opens up the possibility that this interpretation 
lends itself to a more fundamentally epistemological one that could 
inform our perception of social totality:
  If [the Objective Logic] contains [a critique of real 
relations], then only in the sense that it is mediated directly through the 
criticism of thought-determinations. A critique of both real relations of 
indifference and real relations of domination must be mediated through 
the critical presentation of thought that presents relations as those 
of indifference and domination. The transformation of this latter kind 
of criticism into the former kind however can only take place through 
the identification of the appearance/seeming (Schein) of thought-
determinations with that of their real appearance (reelle Erscheinung). 116 
With the above discussion, I think we can see how Marx has taken 
on Hegel’s method to develop a ‘ruthless criticism of all that exists’, and 
which Theunissen also sees potentially realised in Hegel. Theunissen’s 
great insight that indifference and domination serve as the cornerstones 
of Hegel’s criticism on the level of the Logic will, I think, easily prove 
themselves to be equally fundamental to Marx. It would take a more 
rigorous look at the incorporation of Hegel’s method in Marx than 
performed by Arthur to see the homology of both in terms of serving a 
fundamental critique of capitalist self-understanding. 
115  Reasons that obviously cannot become a part of the discussion here, but 
elaborated in Theunissen’s book in great detail.
116  Theunissen (1981), p. 144.
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